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Abstract 
 
Italy’s research and innovation are examined in this article moving from the structure of the 
country’s economy and innovation system, examining the dynamics of private and public activities 
and the impact of policies. As a result of the long recession started in 2008, industrial production 
and investment experienced dramatic reductions, weakening business performances in R&D and 
innovation; policies have relied on ‘horizontal’ tax incentives for R&D, patenting and new 
machinery, with limited effects. Austerity-driven reduction of public expenditure has led to major 
cuts in public R&D and university budgets, combined with new rules for evaluation and merit-
based financing. As a result, gaps between Italy’s research and innovation and EU average 
performances have increased. Four key policy questions are identified: the possibility for Italians 
firms to grow with modest technological activities; the longer term impact of underfunding the 
public R&D and university system; the consequences of a low presence of university graduates in 
the labour force; the sustainability of the increasing regional divergence within Italy’s research and 
innovation system. 
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1. Introduction: weak technology, weak economy
1
 
 
Studies of Italy’s economic development have long pointed out its weaker technological capabilities 
compared to other European countries and a trajectory of growth characterised by low R&D 
activities and a modest presence in high technology industries.
2
 Postwar industrialisation extended 
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 This article builds on the work of the authors for the RIO Reports on Italy for the European 
Commission-Joint Research Center Research and Innovation Observatory (RIO) (Nascia and 
Pianta, 2014, 2015; Nascia et al., 2016, 2017, 2018; Pianta 2018b). Comments from our co-authors 
Lorenzo Isella and Giovanni La Placa are gratefully acknowledged. The findings of this article have 
been presented at the conference ‘Research and innovation in Italy and Europe’organised by the 
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei in Rome on 7 February 2018. We thank the President of the 
Accademia, Alberto Quadrio Curzio, and the participants for their interests and comments.  
2
 See, among a large literature, the historical studies of de Cecco (2004), Gomellini and Pianta 
(2007), Amatori et al. (2013), Barbiellini Amidei et al. (2013), Bianchi (2013); the technological 
role of state-owned industry is examined in Ciocca (2015) and Antonelli et al. (2015); research, 
2 
 
the range of the country’s capabilities, including an important presence in advanced industries – 
office machinery, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, etc. – with a major role played by state 
owned enterprises. The decades from the 1960s to the 1990s were marked by a succession of cycles 
of technology-driven expansion in new areas, and crises (starting with the 1963 recession) leading 
to restructuring and consolidation in areas of traditional economic strength.  
As economies moved towards the new technological paradigm based on Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs), the role of knowledge production and technological change 
became more relevant. After the crisis of 1992, the closer integration in Europe’s single market and 
– later - single currency, the challenge for Italy to converge to European levels of R&D activities 
and move towards a strategy of technological competitiveness became more stringent. External 
factors that made such convergence difficult included the rules set for the Monetary Union, the 
liberalisation of international capital flows, the rise of finance; on the domestic side, problems came 
from the lack of investment, the persisting small size of firms, the burden of a high public debt, the 
short-termism of domestic political process. Since the 1990s several developments have weakened 
the country’s production system; the large scale privatisation of state owned industries led to a 
major loss of technological and production activities; widespread foreign takeovers of major Italian 
firms brought strategic decision power and R&D laboratories outside the country; relocation of 
production in low-wage countries reduced Italy’s industrial base.  
As a result, the Italian economy has largely failed to converge towards Europe’s economic 
performances, with a widening gap in terms of R&D, education and technological capabilities. Italy 
experienced two decades of productivity growth close to zero, resulting in stagnating GDP, low 
wages and poor employment dynamics. R&D and innovation have played an important role in this 
lackluster performance, and weak technology activities have emerged as key factors in Italy’s 
economic decline.
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The crisis of 2008 and its consequences on Italy’s technology and growth have to be viewed in this 
historical perspective. The country has experienced a decade of recession and stagnation and is 
falling behind European standards in terms of research and innovation. 
In this article we investigate Italy’s economic and technological performances in the last decade and 
examine in detail the policies carried out for research and innovation. We first consider overall 
R&D efforts, business innovative activities; we then consider the public sector, its R&D budgets, 
universities and education; we finally address the operation of the innovation system, the specific 
policies that have been introduced, and identify key challenges for public action.  
 
Italy’s ‘lost decade’ 
 
The crisis started in 2008 has accelerated a weakening of Italy’s economy. GDP in 2017 is still 5.4 
percentage points below pre-crisis levels; GDP per capita is back to the level of eighteen years ago; 
industrial production and gross fixed investment recorded losses that reached 25% of their 2007 
levels. Since 2016 the Italian economy has experienced a modest recovery; in the second quarter of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
innovation and industrial policy are analysed in Pianta (1996), Fortis et al. (2002), Onida (2004), 
Lucchese et al. (2016), Fortis and Quadrio Curzio (2018); Italy’s industrial decline is discussed in 
Gallino (2003), Toniolo and Visco (2004); the question of Mezzogiorno is investigated in Prota and 
Viesti (2012); the European context is examined in Celi et al. (2018).  
3
 Several studies have identified the lack of a ‘virtuous circle’ between technology and economic 
performance in Italy and other Southern European countries. See Guarascio et al. (2016) and 
Guarascio and Pianta (2017) for the circular link between R&D, new products, exports and profits; 
Guarascio et al. (2015) considered the role of business cycles in these relationships. The link 
between R&D, innovation and profits has been investigated in Bogliacino and Pianta (2013) for 
industries and in Bogliacino et al. (2016) for Italian firms. Cirillo (2017) documented the different 
links between technology and skills in Northern and Southern Europe.  
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2018 Italy’s GDP registered, compared to the previous quarter, an increase in real terms of 0.2% 
and had a 1.1% growth compared to the second quarter of 2017 (ISTAT, 2018a). After an increase 
in 2017 of 1.5%, Italy’s GDP is expected to have a 1.4% growth in 2018, well below the Euro area 
average (anticipating an increase of 2.3% in 2018), widening the gap with most EU countries
 
 
(ISTAT, 2018b). 
Figure 1 shows the divergence between Italy’s GDP and that of the EU and major countries. 
Compared to 2007, by 2017 Germany had increased its GDP by 12.3%, the EU28 average by 8.3% 
and even Spain has gone above its pre-crisis level, while Italy was still lagging, with little sign of a 
full recovery. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Much worse is Italy’s investment performance, with gross fixed capital formation falling in real 
terms by 22.9% between 2007 and 2017; in the last two years machinery and equipment 
expenditure has slightly picked up, while construction remains 35.8% below pre-crisis levels, 
according to the data made available by Istat
4
. Again, the gap with the EU average and countries 
such as Germany and France has widened. 
The long recession has pushed unemployment rates up, from 6% in 2008 to 12.7% in 2014, with a 
fall to 10.9% in June 2018; youth unemployment has reached a peak of 32.6%. The precarisation of 
employment has increased; employees with a fixed-term contract increased from 2.3 million in June 
2008 to 3.1 million in June 2018 (ISTAT,2018c). 
Industrial production has registered a 25% fall in real terms between 2007 and 2015, followed by a 
modest improvement. This evolution has been investigated by Lucchese et al. (2016) showing that, 
compared to 2007 levels, the decline in output by Italian industry is greater in medium-high and 
medium-low technology sectors (-29% and -32% respectively from April 2008 to July 2015), while 
the reduction is less dramatic in low technology industries (-19%), and is limited in high tech 
sectors (-2%), which however account for about 9% only of total value added in manufacturing and 
for 6% only of total employees (full-time equivalent units in 2013). Moreover, the study has split 
industrial output between sales to domestic and foreign markets, finding that the fall in domestic 
demand, worsened by austerity policies, appears to be the key driver of the loss of manufacturing 
production, while industry’s export have returned to pre-crisis levels. 
A structural feature of Italy’s economy is the small firm size and the inadequate ability of firms to 
survive and grow. In 2011 Italy’s companies above 250 employees were about 3,000 - the 0.1% of 
all Italian firms - compared with 9,000 in Germany and 4,000 in France; in manufacturing they 
accounted for 35% only of value added, as opposed to a EU average of 55% (Lucchese et al., 2016; 
Onida, 2004). In 2015 the 3,472 Italian firms above 250 employees accounted for 30% of the value 
added and 20% of total employment. In the same year, investment in firms above 20 employees 
recorded a 12% increase, opposed to the fall by 18.7% of investments in firms below 10 employees 
(ISTAT, 2017a).  Firm creation in 2016 is significantly up. However the ‘new’ firms that were 
created in 2011 had 352,000 employees in 2011 and experienced a job reduction to 302,000 in their 
2016 employment (ISTAT, 2018d). 
The impact of Italy’s long recession goes beyond that of a temporary business cycle downturn; a 
structural change in Italy’s economy has emerged, with a decline of production and technological 
capabilities. Such a weakening of the supply structure has gone hand in hand with the slow 
dynamics of demand. Exports are the only demand component that recovered rapidly, and export-
oriented industries and firms have had above average performances. With low imports due to 
sluggish domestic demand, Italy’s trade balance has consistently recorded a surplus. 
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 Investments data have been downloaded from www.dati.istat.it - Gross fixed capital formation by 
asset and industry. 
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Alongside the fall of investment, the reduction of public expenditure has significantly contributed to 
Italy’s long recession. Since 2009, EU-inspired austerity policies have forced a continued reduction 
of the budget deficit, from 3.0% of GDP in 2014 to 2.5% in 2016, 2.3% in 2017, and an expected 
1.6% in 2018 (MEF, 2018), leading to widespread budget cuts, a dramatic fall of public investments 
and a reduction of public R&D expenditure. Austerity’s negative effects on growth, however, have 
failed to reduce the public debt to GDP ratio – 115.4% in 2010, 131.5% in 2015 and 132% in 2016, 
131.8 % in 2017 – which remains a key weakness of Italy’s economy (Eurostat, 2018).  
 
2. Italy’s Research and Innovation activities 
 
An effective summary’s of Italy’s technological position in the international context is provided by 
Figure 2, taken from the OECD Science and Technology Indicators Scoreboard (OECD, 2017, 
p.26). Countries are represented by circles whose size is proportional to total R&D expenditure in 
2015 and they are positioned on the basis of R&D as a share of GDP and number of researchers per 
employees. On both variables Italy is dramatically lagging behind EU averages; its values are about 
one third those of Sweden, Finland and Denmark, less than half those of Germany and France and 
higher than Poland and Turkey alone, among major countries. In terms of size of R&D expenditure 
Italy has been overtaken by India, Russia and Brazil. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
In 2015 Italy’s total R&D expenditure (GERD) was €22.1 billion, 1.34% of GDP; data for 2016 
indicate an increase to €23.2 billion, 1.38% of GDP5. In France and Germany 2015 total R&D 
expenditure was 2.22% and 2.94% of GDP respectively. Italy’s R&D efforts are still far from the 
policy commitments assumed at the EU level; two decades ago Europe2020 strategy set the goal of 
a 3% R&D to GDP ratio for all countries; less ambitious and more feasible targets were later 
adopted, and Italy’s target is now to achieve a 1.53% ratio by 2020; in order to achieve that goal 
Italy should increase its R&D expenditure by €2.5 billion, about 11% above current levels. 
The long term trends of R&D spending in Europe and major EU countries are shown in Figure 3. 
The increase in the gap compared to Germany and France has been remarkable, with signs of 
convergence in the period 1995-2016 and a serious divergence since the crisis of 2007. Italy’s R&D 
has not taken advantage the opportunities offered by the introduction of the Monetary Union and 
has deeply suffered from the 2007 crisis. Conversely, Germany has reacted to the crisis with an 
acceleration of its R&D efforts, that increased in real terms by 20% since 2007. France has an 
intermediate trajectory, but has also distanced Italy in terms of R&D expenditure. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Within Italy’s R&D, different trajectories have emerged; Figure 4 shows the composition of Italy’s 
R&D efforts. R&D carried out in firms (BERD, including that financed by public funds) has 
increased substantially between 2006 and 2016. Conversely, government R&D allocations 
(GBAORD) have systematically fallen since 2007, in the context of the overall reduction of public 
expenditure. These cuts have also been pointed out by the European Commission in its report on 
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 The latest Istat data (Istat, 2018e) are based on a different methodology from past Istat surveys; in 
particular, a different imputation procedure for non-responses in the survey on firms has been 
adopted. Moreover, some R&D organisations previously classified as nonprofit have turned into 
business firms; this has also affected the sharp fall (-18.6% between 2015 and 2016) in Nonprofit 
R&D. An overview of data on Italy’s R&D and other science and technology indicators is in 
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (2018). 
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Italy for the 2017 European semester: ‘Between 2007 and 2015, the Italian government’s budget 
allocated to R&D activities fell from €9.9 billion to €8.3 billion’ (European Commission, 2017a). 
In 2016, in terms of funding, 52.1% of resources for R&D have been provided by the business 
sector, 35.2% by the public sector and 9.8% have come from abroad. Business is the largest 
performer of R&D, with 60.8% of total GERD, followed by universities with 24.2% and public 
institutions - mainly research organisations - with 12.6% of GERD (ISTAT, 2018e).  
In 2013 large firms with more than 500 employees concentrated 62.5% of business performed 
R&D; small firms with less than 50 employees performed 10.3% (ISTAT, 2015a). The share of 
foreign funded R&D has remained constant since 2010 at 0.14% of GDP in 2016, below the EU28 
average of 0.2% of GDP. The ratio of business performed R&D to GDP at 0.84%, % remains far 
behind France or Germany, where it reaches 1.5% and 2%, respectively. This gap is rooted in the 
lower R&D efforts of large firms and and in the scarce number of ‘big spenders’ in R&D, compared 
to Germany and France (Sterlacchini, 2017, p.391). The increase in business performed R&D since 
2001 has been mainly associated to higher (although not persistent) expenditure by small and 
medium sized firms, including a strong performance of firms with 249-500 employees (Bonaccorsi 
and Perani, 2014). Europe’s 2017 Industrial scoreboard lists the top 1000 EU firms in terms of 
R&D; 38 only are Italian, spending a total of €6 billion, two thirds of which is accounted by the top 
four R&D spenders - Leonardo Finmeccanica (aerospace and defense), Telecom Italia 
(telecommunications), Unicredit and Intesa Sanpaolo (banking sector). Fiat is now registered as a 
Dutch company. The 38 Italian companies in the scoreboard record around €6b, equal to the 3% of 
the total R&D investments in EU with a slight increase between 2016 and 2017, 4%, with a 
slowdown of R&D in 12 companies. Among the top 1000 EU firms in terms of R&D there are 224 
German companies accounting for 76.3 billion of R&D, with an average growth of their spending 
of 6.7% between 2016 and 2017 (European Commission, 2017b). 
In addition to direct expenditures, the role of tax incentives for R&D should also be considered. As 
documented by the Science, research and innovation 2016 Report of the European Commission, 
France, the UK and the Netherlands provided greater incentives than Italy (European Commission, 
2016b). When the foregone tax income associated to R&D tax incentives is added to the direct 
expenditure of governments for financing business R&D, the gap between major EU countries and 
Italy becomes even larger; in 2014 the combined value for France was 0.37% of GDP, for the 
Netherlands was 0.20%, for the UK 0.17%, while for Italy was 0.05% of GDP (Nauwelaers, 2016, 
p.144). Since then, however, Italy has introduce generous tax incentives for R&D, as discussed in 
section 4 below. As a result, signs of R&D dynamism were found by a Unioncamere survey of 
August 2017, with 11,300 firms expecting a 10-15% increase of their R&D investments; 40% of 
these firms had no R&D expenditure in 2016 (MEF et al., 2017). 
 
Innovation in firms 
 
R&D expenditures are an indicator of the inputs used for developing knowledge and technologies 
and have to be complemented with indicators of the outputs in terms of quantity and quality of 
innovations introduced by firms. Important evidence in this regard is provided by the Community 
Innovation Surveys. Using these data, the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2017 ranked Italy as a 
‘moderate innovator’ since its performance is well below the EU28 average for many indicators 
(European Commission, 2017a). The modest (and worsening) innovative performance of Italian 
firms has been documented by the results of the Community Innovation Survey for the years 2014-
2016, published by Istat in 2018 (ISTAT, 2018g; ISTAT 2016a). Considering all types of 
innovation - in products, processes, organisation and marketing - the share of Italian firms (with 10 
employees or more) that have carried out innovative activities during that period was 48.7%, as 
opposed to 44.6% in 2012-2014 and 51.9% for the 2010-2012 period. The firms engaged in 
innovations in products and processes only were 38.1% as opposed to 31.9% and 35.5% in previous 
periods. Among the firms with more than 250 employees this share is 74.9 (an increase over the 
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previous period), while firms with 10 to 49 employees have a share of innovators of 35% and firms 
with 50 to 249 employees have a share of 57.6% (ibid., p.1). 
Total innovation expenditure in 2016 has been € 30.6 billion, with an increase over the 23.2 billion 
of 2014. R&D accounts for close to half total expenditure. On average, in 2014 Italian firms have 
spent for new products and processes 7,800 euros per employee, against 6,200 in 2014. Close to one 
third of firms has obtained public incentives for innovation, up from one quarter in the previous 
period. The economic impact of the new products that have been introduced is modest; in 2014 
products that are new to the market accounted for 9.8% of sales of innovating firms; another 7.9% 
was due to products that are new to the firms only (including imitation of products by competitors) 
(ibid.). In all these indicators Italy has an innovative performance that remains distant from that of 
major European countries. 
New attention has been devoted to the relevance of ‘high growth firms’ defined as those recording 
for three subsequent years a growth rate of turnover above 10%; these firms tend to be more present 
in high technology manufacturing activities. Data for Italy show that such firms account for 5.8% 
only of the total number of firms, accounting for 9.7% of total employment; most major EU 
countries – including Germany, the UK, France, the Netherlands – have much higher shares that 
appear to be associated to a greater dynamism of national economies (Hölzl, 2016, p.250). 
 
International R&D flows  
 
Italy’s technological activities have to be set in the context of international R&D flows as foreign 
know how remains a relevant source of technology and multinational corporations organise their 
R&D activities at a global scale, affecting developments at the national level. Italy’s economy is 
highly open in terms of trade, investment and technology flows, and is increasingly integrated in 
global production systems (ICE, 2016). In 2015 in Italy around 9,700 foreign groups produced 
value added for about €109 billion, employing 1,2 million people.6 However, the 2008 crisis has led 
to a fall of foreign investment more severe than in the EU average; as argued by the European 
Semester Report of the European Commission, ‘Foreign direct investment inflows in 2015 were 
52% lower than in 2007, while for the EU as a whole they dropped by 42%’ (European 
Commission, 2017a. p.48). As a result of Italy’s long recession, inflows of foreign direct 
investments in the country have remained weak and the relevance of internationalization for 
research and innovation appears to have slowed down, with signs of recovery in more recent years 
only. A significant trend has been the takeover of major Italian firms; acquisitions and new 
ownership arrangements with a dominant position of foreign investors have been frequent, 
involving among others important firms such as Telecom, Pirelli, Italcementi, Ilva; the prospects for 
maintaining R&D and managerial activities in Italy is at best uncertain. 
Using Istat data on Italy’s R&D performers, Cozza and Zanfei (2014) showed that from 2000 to 
2010 the share of Italian firms that carry out R&D and belong to a foreign group has declined from 
about 11 to 7%, with a much slower growth than the number of independent Italian firms that are 
R&D performers. Moreover, the total amount of expenditures and the number of R&D employees 
of such foreign-owned firms have declined, while domestic firms expanded. Over the same period 
foreign-owned firms in Italy also reduced their extra-muros R&D expenditure and the extent of 
their cooperation with universities (ibid.). 
In their contribution to the ICE report on Italy in the international economy, Cozza and Zanfei 
(2016) note that with regard to R&D “foreign presence in Italy is scarce, weak and increasingly 
fragile in terms of commitment to research (…). Moreover, foreign multinationals have a very good 
capacity to develop high technology linkages with firms and institutions at the international level, 
but have a low propensity to develop technological linkages with Italian firms and institutions, 
including universities”. They conclude that “policies for attracting foreign investment in Italy do not 
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 ISTAT (2017b); finance and insurance industries are excluded. 
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guarantee by themselves the creations of technological linkages that may favour local development” 
and argue that “if the gradual disengagement of foreign multinationals from Italian research were to 
continue, the research and innovation capacities of Italy’s productive system would be further 
impoverished” (Cozza and Zanfei, 2016, p.302-303). Moreover, foreign multinationals in Italy 
appear to establish less technological links with domestic firms than is the case with Italian-based 
multinationals (Cozza et al., 2018). 
The opposite phenomenon of R&D carried out abroad by Italian multinationals is characterized by 
very modest activities, compared to those of major EU countries, although with some increase in 
recent years. In 2007 business R&D expenditure by affiliates abroad as a percentage of domestic 
R&D was about 3% for Italy, against more than 20% for Germany and close to 50% for Sweden 
(Cozza and Zanfei, 2014, p.46). 
Alongside these quantitative aspects of international technology flows, the quality of Italy’s 
position in the international division of labour is also changing; Italy’s firms are increasingly 
involved in international production in a weaker hierarchical position. Rather than managing the 
value chain and controlling final markets, a growing number of firms acts as subcontractor in the 
emerging production system centred in Germany and extending over a number of neighbouring 
European countries (Stöllinger et al., 2013; Celi et al. 2018). A study on Italy’s manufacturing over 
the 1998-2006 period found that supplier firms to global value chains tend to have lower 
productivity than Italian firms selling to final markets – controlling for similar levels of innovation 
and export activities - although such a gap disappears for firms with higher technological and export 
competences (Agostino et al. 2015). 
Besides the R&D flows entering Italy as a result of foreign investment, significant sources of R&D 
funds have come from the EU Framework Programmes and EU Structural Funds. Framework 
Programmes (FP6 and FP7), followed by Horizon 2020, have been a relevant channel for the 
funding of research in Italy. In FP7 calls the success rate of Italian proposals was 18.3% and Italy 
was the fourth highest financed country (more than €3.6 billion from 2007 to October 20147), after 
the UK, France and Germany; business participation was strong, with six Italian firms among the 
top 50 recipients of signed grants for firms in 2007-2013, two universities in the top 50 and six 
research centres in the top 50
8
. Less successful has been Italy’s participation to Horizon 2020; 
according to a report published in 2017, Italy obtained 4,780 awarded grants, 9.5% of grants 
awarded by Horizon 2020. Until February 2017 Italy has been financed for €1.7 billion, 8% of total 
available budget; the success rate of Italian applications is below the EU average; in awarded 
grants, about 75% of the budget is allocated in the regions of Italy’s North-West and Centre (APRE, 
2017). 
 
3. The public sector and universities 
 
In the last decade Italy’s public R&D has experienced a major decline, with a continuing fall from 
€9,235 million in 2008, to €7,789 million in 2012 and €7,441 million in 2016, with a 19% fall 
between 2008 and 2016 (data are in real terms at purchasing power standards, 2005 prices). Figure 
5 shows this decline in total civilian government appropriations for R&D (GBAORD). European 
comparisons further highlight the weakness of Italy’s public R&D budgets. In 2016 the Italy’s 
government performed R&D was 0.17% of GDP, well below the EU average of 0.23%. Also the 
R&D funded by the government is below the EU average: in 2015 only 0.51% against a EU average 
of 0.63% of GDP. The public sector and universities are by far the main recipients of government 
direct funding. In the period 2005-2014 only about 10% of public funds have been used to fund 
R&D performed by the business sector. 
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 Data come from the official web site of the FP7 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm?pg=country-profile 
8
 Seventh FP7 Monitoring Report 2013 11/03/2015 
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The constraints for reducing public expenditure coming from European-inspired austerity policies 
have played a role in this fall, but the European Commission itself has argued in the European 
Semester fiche that Italy’s public expenditure on R&D is well below the EU average, pointing out 
that it produces an output in terms of highly cited papers that is in line with the EU average
9
 
(European Commission, 2016a, p.3). Moreover, the document argues that the contribution of the 
private sector is extremely low – in Italy the share of business R&D in GDP is about half the EU 
average and the share of public R&D funded by private firms is among the lowest in Europe (ibid., 
p.4).  
 
Figure 5 here 
 
Public R&D cuts have led to lower resources for both general university funding, public research 
programmes and funding for firms. For universities, in 2017 the government allocated €6,981 
million for general university funding (FFO) – a slight increase than in 2015; in 2014 funds were 
€7,000 million; in 2008 funds were €7,500 million.  
For universities and public research organisations a growing share of funding is allocated on the 
basis of performance indicators, based on ANVUR’s research evaluation exercise (VQR); within 
general university funds (FFO) the share is expected to increase from 13.5% in 2013, to 20% in 
2016, to 24% in 2018. Priority funding has been introduced for the ‘Departments of excellence’; 
starting from 2018, €271 million are allocated to top Departments, identified by a MIUR 
Commission. Additional €45 million are allocated for a €3,000 research bonus to selected 
researchers. The plan for introducing 500 positions for highly qualified full professors (‘Cattedre 
Natta’, with an allocation of €113 million) outside standard academic recruitment processes has 
been suspended after heavy criticism. 
Funds for competitive research calls have also been drastically reduced. Resources for National 
Research Projects (Progetti di interesse nazionale, PRIN) decreased from €100 million in 2009 to 
€38.2 million in 2012 and were zero in 2013 and 2014. In November 2015 a PRIN call was 
launched, with a budget of €91.9 million, that financed 300 projects out of 4300 proposals. In 2017 
a new call with a funding of €391 million has been launched. 
Resources for Basic Research Projects (Fondo per gli investimenti nella ricerca di base, FIRB) 
amounted to €29.5 million in the call of 2012. In 2013 and 2014 no new FIRB projects were 
launched. In 2014 MIUR published the competitive funding call Scientific Independence of Young 
Researchers (SIR) with a budget of €47 million; it has not been re-financed since then. In 2013 
FAR, the larger fund for industrial R&D, was suspended for lack of funding.  
Italy's policy of cutting back on R&D spending has been criticised by several institutional actors. In 
2015 CRUI, the body representing Rectors of universities, released a document commenting the 
new allocation of university funds (FFO) and emphasised the reduction of more than €800 million 
in university funds from 2009 to 2015; as a share of GDP these funds fell from 0.49% of GDP in 
2009 to 0.42% in 2015, as opposed to the 0.99% of France and 0.93% of Germany (CRUI, 2015). 
A report on innovation, research and universities has been published by the foundation Italiadecide 
(2017) with an introduction by the head of Italy’s association of university Rectors, CRUI. The 
report examined Italy’s university and research system documenting that since 2008 university staff 
has fallen by 15% and university funds by 20% (Manfredi, 2017). It argued for a new policy of 
‘strategic investment’ in research and universities, with greater resources, more attention to 
professional degrees and doctorates, to technology transfer and start-ups, to industrial policy and 
finance for innovation (Italiadecide, 2017). 
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 The variables used are scientific publications within the 10% most cited publications worldwide as 
a percentage of total scientific publications of the country, fractional counting method and the ratio 
of such publications and government expenditure on R&D plus higher education expenditure on 
R&D. See below for an analysis of Italy’s scientific output. 
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The constraints from reduced expenditures have been serious. In the European Semester fiche 
devoted public expenditure the Commission showed that from 2008 to 2015 Italy’s share of public 
investment in total government expenditure has fallen from 6.2 to 4.5% (EU-28 data were 7.4 and 
6.2%); the share of education in GDP from 2009 to 2014 fell from 4.6 to 4.1% (EU-28 data were 
5.3 and 4.9%); the share of government budget outlays for R&D in GDP over the same period fell 
from to 0.62 to 0.50% (EU-28 data were 0.75 and 0.64%). In all fields, Italy’s austerity policy has 
led to a reduction of resources, worsening the previously existing gap with EU-28 averages 
(European Commission, 2016b). 
 
Universities’ funds and personnel 
 
The sharp reduction in public R&D spending is at the root of the decline of university funding and 
staff, trends that have been highlighted also by the reports of ANVUR (the State Agency for 
Evaluation of Universities and Research) for 2016 and 2018 (ANVUR, 2016a, 2018). Italy has 61 
state universities that account for 90% of registered students in all universities; non-state 
universities are 30, including 11 distance learning private organisations that account for 3.5% of 
students.  
The resources devoted to the university system have experienced a major reduction. Considering 
state universities, total resources (in current euros) obtained in 2000 were €9,074m, reaching a 
maximum of €13,570m in 2008, followed by a continuing fall, down to €12,258m in 2014. In real 
terms, this amounts to a 25% increase from 2000 to 2008 and to a 14% fall between 2008 and 2014; 
falling transfers from the central government account for most of this decline in funding (ibid., 
p.297). 
Falling resources and limitations of turnover set by government policy have led to a serious 
reduction in university staff; between 2009 and 2016 the number of professors and researchers with 
permanent contracts has decreased by 20% (a loss of 12,000 people, from 60,882 in 2009 to 48,878 
in 2016), a fall higher than in other public administrations. Figure 6 shows the evolution of 
university permanent employment. 
 
Figure 6 here 
 
The figure does not include junior researchers employed with fixed term contracts; in 2016 
universities employed 5,357 fixed term researchers and 13,946 post-docs (assegnisti di ricerca) with 
an annual contract, very low wages and no teaching duties; the number of ‘assegnisti di ricerca’ 
peaked at 16,081 in 2013 (ANVUR, 2016a, p.359). The ANVUR report documents that out of the 
44,345 that have received an ‘assegno di ricerca’ from 2009 to 2016, 61% is now out of university 
employment, 29% remain in the position of ‘assegnista di ricerca’, 9% is university researcher and 
less than 1% has become associate professor; 7% only has obtained the habilitation to the position 
of associate professor (ibid. p.377). These data show how dramatic the reduction of university staff 
resulting from the policy of recent governments has been; the institutional changes introduced have 
also failed to open up new effective ways for young scholars to access university careers. A 
continuing increase in the average age of total university staff has resulted; average age is now 52.6 
years; for full professors average age is 60 (ibid. p.387); a major problem is likely to emerge in the 
next few years when a very large number of current staff will retire. 
A major novelty in university recruitment was introduced in 2012 with the new system of 
habilitation (‘Abilitazione scientifica nazionale’) with university committees selecting prospective 
candidates to the positions of full and associate professors; obtaining the habilitation is a necessary 
condition for applying to competitions for such positions. In the 2016-2018 period, in the first four 
of the five ‘rounds’ when applications were accepted, 28,954 scholars presented an application for 
either full or associate professor (they were 24,294 in the 2012-2014 session).  
10 
 
The success rates for full professors has been 60.2% (was 43.3% in the previous session); the 
success rate for associate professors has been 54.5% (was 42.8% in the previous session) (ANVUR, 
2018). However, the number of positions that were opened up for competition in Italian universities 
from November 2013 to March 2015 were 3,204 (in 91% of cases for positions of  associate 
professor), just over 10% of the number of habilitations that were granted (ANVUR, 2016a, p. 438). 
There is no updated information on the share of scholars with ‘habilitation’ who have obtained a 
professor position in later years. There is no coherence therefore between the highly complex 
process that has been introduced for selecting prospective candidates through the habilitation 
system and the actual operation of the hiring process of qualified new professors. Considering the 
large number of professors who are approaching retirement, the gap in recruitment is likely to 
remain serious. 
 
Migration of researchers 
 
A major problem for Italy's high skill human resources is the growing emigration of graduates and 
researchers. The ISTAT survey on doctorates showed that the proportion of Ph.D. holders living 
abroad has doubled from 2009 to 2014, reaching 12.9% (ISTAT, 2015b). ISTAT data on migrations 
show that in 2016 81,184 Italian citizens above 24 years of age migrated abroad, of which 24,678 
had a university degree (+9% over the previous year);  the share of graduates among migrants is 
30%, a value far higher than the ratio of graduates in Italy’s labour force (ISTAT, 2017c). More 
specific data on the migration of scientific researchers have been provided by the OECD, based on 
the change of national affiliation of authors with at least two published articles in the Scopus 
scientific database (OECD, 2017). Figures 7 and 8 report the key findings. As shown in Figure 7, 
from 2002 to 2016 nearly 11,000 researchers migrated from Italy, the highest number in EU 
countries (out of a total of around 35,000 moving out of a country in the whole EU). The migration 
outflows accelerated after 2010 and 58% of Italian researchers migrated after 2011. Figure 8 shows 
that Italy is a net ‘exporter’ of researchers to all major countries, including the US, the UK, France, 
Germany and even Spain (OECD, 2017, p.128-129). 
The negative trends on the migration of graduates and researchers represent a serious loss for Italy’s 
research and innovation system, a threat to its sustainability in terms of scientific research and 
teaching, and a major hindrance to catching up with the rest of Europe in terms of R&I.  
 
Figure 7 Figure 8 here 
 
Italy’s research output 
 
The ANVUR 2016 Report has documented the output of Italy’s research system with an analysis of 
scientific publications in the SciVal database of Scopus. In the period 2011-2014 Italy’s share of 
world scientific publications is 3.5% - against 6.5 of the UK, 5.8 of Germany and 4.2 of France – 
with an average annual increase of 4% - against 1.4 of the UK, 1.9 of Germany and 1.5 of France. 
When the analysis is limited to high quality publications, appearing in the 5% of journals with the 
highest scientific impact (measured by citations), Italy’s share of its publications included in this 
group in 2014 is 11% - against 13.9 of the UK, 11.8 of Germany and 12.4 of France, just over the 
EU-27 average of 10.9. Italy’s increase has been significant, from a 8.1% share in 2001 (ANVUR, 
2016a, p.602,610). The evidence suggests that Italy’s scientific output is converging rapidly to the 
standards of European countries of similar size. 
However the number of Italian researchers and the resources available are far lower in Italy than in 
similar European countries. The result are levels of productivity that in Italy are much higher than 
in most countries. The number of scientific publications per researcher in 2013 in Italy is 0.61 - 
against the 0.40 of the UK, 0.29 of Germany and 0.32 of France – the highest among advanced 
countries (US data are not available). The number of scientific publications per unit of total R&D 
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expenditure (in millions of US dollars) in 2014 in Italy is 4.04 - against 4.34 of the UK, 1.65 of 
Germany and 2.10 of France; a similar ranking appears when R&D for higher education only is 
considered (ibid., p.627-628). Figure 9 presents these data and changes since 2011; Italy is the only 
country with a consistent increase in productivity, while the UK (the only country with higher levels 
than Italy) had a declining performance since 2012. Germany, France and the EU28 average show 
2015 values that returned to 2011 levels, after a modest increase in intermediate years; their 
scientific productivity levels are dramatically lower than those of Italy and the UK (ANVUR, 
2016b, p.30). 
 
Figure 9 here 
 
When the quality of scientific publications is considered, using the total number of citations 
received by publications, the picture does not change. The number of citations divided by the total 
number of researchers in 2014 in Italy is 2.18 - against the 2.42 of the UK, 1.03 of Germany and 
1.04 of France. The number of citations divided by total R&D expenditure (in millions of US 
dollars) in 2014 in Italy is 13.05 - against 14.64 of the UK, 5.59 of Germany and 6.48 of France 
(ibid., p.629-630). 
Data from the ANVUR Report confirm that Italy’s university and research system is characterised 
by a paradox (pointed out already in Nascia and Pianta, 2015). On the one hand there are limited 
resources with a long term reduction of university personnel and funding. On the other hand Italy’s 
performances in international scientific publications have steadily improved and have converged to 
those of the main European countries. Italy’s researchers – in spite of the poor number of scientists, 
university funding, R&D expenditure and business R&D efforts – have shown a positive 
performance, improving the quality and impact of their publications. The available evidence 
confirms the concerns that such positive performances could be a short term effect that could be 
undermined if no large increase in the resources and number of researchers is introduced. The lack 
of hiring of young scholars and the aging of researchers may lead to higher apparent productivity, 
as younger scholars are less active in publications and less cited. As a large part of senior scholars 
approach retirement, there is a risk that in future years there will be not enough younger scholars 
capable to produce high quality research. This danger is made more serious by the large scale 
emigration of researchers that is taking place (Nascia and Pianta, 2015; Nascia et al. 2016). 
 
Evaluation of universities 
 
Since the 2010 'Gelmini reform', universities and public research organisations have experienced a 
systematic process of evaluation; ANVUR is the institution in charge of the periodic evaluation of 
universities and public research organisations falling under the authority of MIUR. The quality of 
scientific production of professors and researches is regularly assessed by the VQR (Valutazione 
della qualità della ricerca), that has been implemented for the 2004-2010 and 2011-2014 periods. 
The VQR is based on bibliometric indicators and on external auditors and is used as the basis for 
the allocation of the premial share of the FFO and FOE, the general funds for universities and 
Public research organisations. Quality assurance processes have been introduced for teaching 
activities, with the activities of 'Nuclei di valutazione' and 'Presidi di qualità' in each university and 
a complex system of self-evaluation of Degree courses that include student representatives and the 
consideration of questionnaires by students assessing the quality of teaching. The recruiting of new 
personnel is subject to the ex ante screening of the Abilitazione scientifica nazionale (ASN) and to 
the ex post evaluation of the VQR. Finally, ANVUR organises regular visits in universities by 
external experts in charge of controlling procedures and assessing quality, resulting in a public 
accreditation report. Similar steps are undertaken for the evaluation of the public research 
organisations supervised by MIUR (ANVUR, 2016b). 
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The 2016 ANVUR report identified the areas of strength and weakness on Italian universities. 
Strengths included the good and improving performance of Italian researchers at the international 
level, based on publications and citations obtained in the scientific literature; this has happened in 
spite of a reduction in available funds. ANVUR also documented the overall ability of universities 
to provide quality teaching, in spite of a high students/teachers ratio and a low expenditure per 
student (ANVUR, 2016a, Introduction, p.6-7). The weaknesses documented by ANVUR are mainly 
the result of inadequate funding, rather than of inefficiency in operation; they include the fall in 
university staff (due to government rules on turnover limitation); uncertainty on careers, leading to 
a high share of PhDs and 'assegnisti di ricerca' that abandon the research career or move abroad; 
inadequate funds for student support, managed in different ways across regions; wide disparities 
across regions in the quality of teaching and research (ibid.). 
The evaluation arrangements recently introduced in Italy have burdened universities with a heavy 
load of bureaucratic work and have often been subject to criticism due to a lack of consensus on 
appropriate evaluation procedures. Moreover, in a context of diminishing funding for universities, 
the introduction of evaluation and its use for allocating resources to stronger institutions has 
introduced widening disparities across regions, universities and academic fields (see the next 
section on policies). While an evaluation culture is now widely accepted in Italy's universities, 
serious criticism remains on the implementation of evaluation procedures and on their effective 
contribution to improving teaching and research in Italy. 
 
Education, skills and human resources 
 
The worst effects of declining public R&D and university funding can be found in the low and 
declining educational attainments of Italians. In 2015 24.9% of the population aged 30-34 had 
tertiary education, putting Italy at the bottom of EU countries, well below the EU28 average of 
38.5%. Conversely, 80% of people aged 20-24 had completed upper secondary education, not far 
from the EU average of 82.6% (European Commission, 2016c). The number of graduates in a first-
level courses (excluding Masters etc.) peaked in 2005 with 291,189, and amounted to 216,430 in 
2014 (ANVUR, 2016a, p.192). The share of youth completing secondary education that moves on 
to university courses is 42% in Italy against 63% in the EU average.  
The European Semester fiche devoted to education pointed out that Italy’s share of individuals with 
tertiary education – at 25% - is below the national target and very far from the 40% goal set by 
Europe 2020, a level that has now been almost reached by the EU-28 average. Strikingly, a huge 
difference exist between Italy’s rates of graduates for men (20%) and for women (31%) (European 
Commission, 2016d, p.2-8). 
The problem of the low ‘stock’ of graduates in Italy’s population is compounded by the stagnation 
in the number of graduates and decline in the flow of university enrolment. Administrative MIUR 
data
10
 record 277,853 graduates in the academic year 2009-2010 and 310,778 graduates 
11
 in the 
academic year 2016-2017. First-year student enrolments were 307,936 in 2009-2010 and fell to 
306,975 in 2016-2017. Figure 10 reports these data. As documented by Anvur (ANVUR, 2018) the 
fall of enrolments after the academic year 2013/14 showed a recovery in the academic year 
2017/2018, that, however, is limited to Northern regions alone. 
 
Fig. 10 here 
 
These developments represent a threat to the level of Italian human capital in the future. The fall in 
new university students clearly reflects the impact of the long recession, with falling incomes and 
                                                          
10
 Data downloaded from the Anagrafe Nazionale degli Studenti http://anagrafe.miur.it (update 
30/07/2018) 
11
 MIUR data on graduates include graduates from Master courses. 
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expectations of social mobility for most Italians. But enrolments have also been discouraged by the 
steep rise of universities fees, that have increased by 75% in the period 2009-2014 (OECD, 2013); a 
detailed analysis of university activities is provided below. Lack of employment for graduates has 
also discouraged university enrolment. According to Eurostat data, in 2015 the employment rates of 
Italian graduates (aged 20–34) who had completed their education or training between one and three 
years prior to 2015 is equal to 48.5% only; Greece alone has a lower percentage; in Germany the 
share is 90.4%. In Italy the employment rate of recent graduates fell by almost 15 percentage points 
in the last 10 years.
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A parallel decline can be found in the number of Ph.D. students, that fell from 12,093 in 2010 to 
9,279 in 2016. The reform of Ph.D. system required that funded positions be at least 75% of all 
positions offered, leading to a fall in Ph.D. courses from 1,761 in 2010 to 967 in 2018, and to a 
parallel fall in student numbers. A low share of students (about 15.1%) comes from abroad and 
close to 56% of Ph.D. students has graduated from the same university (ANVUR, 2018). The 
ISTAT survey on doctorates (ISTAT, 2015b) found that in 2014 91.5% of people who had gained a 
doctoral degree in 2010 were employed and only about 7% were still looking for a job. However, 
the PNR 2015-2020 documented that in many firms Ph.D. holders are employed in the same 
categories as less skilled personnel. Current measures – including the R&D tax credit and the 
innovative start-up law – provide indirect incentives to firms employing PhDs. Italy’s National 
Research Programme 2015-2020 has introduced the “innovative doctorate”, based on the Principles 
for innovative doctoral training published in 2011 by the European Commission, focusing resources 
on PhD programmes which are international, intersectoral or interdisciplinary. In 2016, 60% of 
public funding for Doctoral programmes has been allocated to programmes fulfilling “innovative 
criteria”. 
 
 
4. The regional divide  
 
The large economic and social disparities between Italy’s North and the South are even starker 
when we examine regional performances in research and innovation. R&D expenditure on regional 
GDP is 1.4% in the North and 0.9% in the South; patents at the European Patent Office per million 
inhabitants are 106.8 in the North and 10.1 in the South, the share of employees in high tech 
industries is 3.7% in the North and 2% in the South (ISTAT, 2015c, p.271). 
Considering the long term evolution of total R&D expenditure in Italy’s regions, Fig.11 shows – 
using Eurostat data – the dramatic increase of the gap between Northern regions on the one hand 
and Central and the Southern regions on the other. While in 1995 the North had a total R&D of 
about 7 billion euros (at 2005 prices), the South had less than 2 billion. In 2014, Northern regions’ 
R&D was greater than 11 billion euros, while Southern regions had a modest increase to more than 
3 billion. Central Italian regions stayed slightly above the R&D values of the South, with a 
stagnation since 2000 just above the 4 billion mark. A major ‘jump’ in the gap between the North 
and the rest of Italy took place since 2007, with a continuing growth trend also during the decade of 
crisis. 
 
Figure 11 here 
 
Territorial imbalances in innovation have also been documented by innovation surveys, showing 
that two thirds of innovating firms and three quarters of total expenditure are concentrated in five 
regions only - Lombardy (with 25% of innovators), Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Piedmont and Lazio. 
                                                          
12
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Employment_rates_of_recent_graduates#Employment_rates_of_recent_gradua
tes 
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In Italy's Southern and island regions less than 13% of Italian firms innovating in products and 
processes are located (Istat, 2016a). Additional evidence has been provided by the ANVUR report 
on the gap between the South and the rest of the country in terms of R&D employment, R&D 
intensity and access to the EU research programme, (ANVUR, 2018). 
A serious divergence has emerged also in university performances - including research outputs, 
teaching standards, student trends. Southern regions have shown poorer performances and greater 
reductions in student enrolment, staff and funding (De Angelis et al., 2016). Universities in the 
South recorded a lower success rate in the 2017 PRIN call and a lower international student 
mobility (ANVUR, 2018). Student support funds, managed at the regional level, have also shown 
differing performances, leading to unequal opportunities for the young in Southern regions 
(ANVUR, 2016a).
13
 The ANVUR report argued that the regional management of funds for 
university students contributes to higher territorial inequalities. However, the 2017 budget law 
increased student support funds in the south (ANVUR, 2018).  The ANVUR report for 2018 
pointed out the growing migration of students from the South to universities located in the rest of 
the country, especially in the North-West; Southern universities have not recovered yet the fall in 
the number of students compared to 2014 levels (ANVUR, 2018). 
This regional divergence is the result of developments in all the areas of research and innovation 
discussed above. Business activities in Central and Southern regions have been heavily affected by 
the decline in industrial production, with an increased presence of low technology activities and 
firms with little R&D. Cuts in public R&D have had a major effect in Southern regions where 
research infrastructures and universities are weaker. The increasing importance of merit-based 
funding of universities has also reduced resources for higher education and public research in the 
South; between 2008 and 2015 the transfers for general university funding (FFO) in current terms 
have fallen by 4.3% in the North; in the Centre and South the fall has been close to 12% 
(Fondazione Res, 2016, p.49).  
The reduction in university education has been dramatic; from 2003-2004 to 2014-2015 the number 
on new enrolments has fallen in Sicily and Sardinia by -30.2%; the rest of the South had a fall of 
25.5%; the Centre had a reduction of 23.7%; the North experienced a contraction of 11%; in recent 
years the number of enrolments has increased again in the North and Centre only (ibid, p.11; Viesti, 
2018; ANVUR, 2018). The results of the Research evaluation exercise (VQR) conducted by 
ANVUR for 2011-2014 show some improvements in the performance of Southern Italian 
universities in terms of products of research and recruitment policies (ANVUR, 2016b). 
Public policies on R&D and universities have a serious responsibility in Italy's growing regional 
disparities in research and innovation. Few policy actions have countered this trend. EU Structural 
Funds have been available in the PONREC programme, with a total allocation for 2014-2020 of 
nearly €4.1 billion in five priority areas: (1) industrial research, (2) structural/infrastructural 
strengthening, (3) clusters and laboratories, (4) smart cities and communities and (5) social 
innovation; actual spending, however, has been limited. The Smart Specialisation programme has 
produced some interesting experiences in selected regions, supporting the trajectories of local 
technological development. 
 
 
5. Policies for research and innovation 
 
The problems of Italy’s research and innovation documented above are the result of long standing 
weaknesses of the national innovation system and of policy decisions. In this section the main 
policies for research and innovation recently introduced in Italy are discussed, exploring their 
impact.  
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The National Research Programme 2015-2020  
 
The framework for Italy’s research and innovation policy is provided by the National Research 
Programme (PNR) for the years 2015-2020, that was developed by MIUR and approved in May 
2015 - with a two-year delay – by CIPE, a Ministerial Committee (MIUR, 2016). Planned 
investment in research is about €2,5 billion for the period 2015-2017; resources that are mobilised 
in the programme include all MIUR funds – for universities, public research organisations, research 
programmes, etc - and EU programmes, including the PON Research and Innovation funds (€1,93 
billion) coming from Europe’s Regional development fund and the European Social Fund, and  
from Europe’s Structural Fund, and €500 million from the FSC (Fondo Sviluppo e Coesione).  
However, the PNR does not include a specific commitment to increase public R&D resources, nor 
changes in the governance of the R&D system. MIUR funds considered in the PNR are the same 
general funding lines for universities and public research organisations and the size of prospective 
additional R&D financing is not clear.  
The main fields of action of the PNR include human capital (€1.02 billion); public private 
partnerships (€487 million); territorial inequalities (€436 million); research infrastructures (€343 
million); internationalisation (€107 million). Its six targets include: 
 Internationalisation and integration in EU programmes, with a focus on Joint programming 
initiatives, and with the leadership of the projects PRIMA (Partnership for Research and 
Innovation in the Mediterranean Area) and  Blue Med on space research. 
 Human capital empowerment through innovative doctoral courses, some specific programmes 
and joint public-private partnerships.  
 Selective support to Research Infrastructures in Italy, in line with ESFRI (European Strategy 
Forum on Research Infrastructures) methods.  
 Public-private partnerships focused on technological clusters, cooperation with the non-profit 
sector and support to social innovation programmes. 
 Territorial programmes for Southern regions integrated in the National Operational Programme 
(PON). 
 Monitoring and assessment activities of R&I expenditure 
 
The PNR also addresses the areas of specialisation of the national smart specialisation strategy set 
up in 2015 (see below, MIUR, 2016). 
 
Policies for business research and innovation 
 
While the National Research Programme provides a weak framework for public action on research 
and innovation, the most important policy effort in recent years has focused on the rise of indirect 
tax incentives to firms for a wide range of activities, including R&D, patents, human capital, 
investment in machinery and in the digital technologies of the Industry 4.0 programme.  
The approach is typical of “horizontal” industrial and innovation policies where no public priorities 
are identified in terms of research missions, technologies, industries, social or environmental 
objectives, and no selective criteria are introduced. The assumption is that firms and markets are 
efficient and effective in making decisions on R&D and innovation projects and on the direction 
that technological change may take and that government action should not introduce ‘distortions’ 
with ‘selective’ measures. The rationale for such ‘horizontal’ policies relied on the expected 
benefits of continued market liberalisation, the provision of context conditions such as education 
and infrastructures, rule-setting in line with European Commission actions for new activities (De 
Vincenti, 2014). However, the effectiveness such ‘horizontal’ policies is increasingly questioned 
also at the European level (see the discussion in Pianta, 2014; Pianta et al. 2016; Lucchese at al. 
2016; Mazzucato, 2018). The main measures introduced for supporting Italian firms’ research and 
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innovation have been investigated in various reports (Nascia and Pianta, 2014, 2015; Nascia et al., 
2016, 2017, 2018) and are summarised here. 
  
R&D tax credit. The R&D tax credit was introduced in 2007 for the years 2008 and 2009. After a 
two year stop, the measure was reintroduced in 2011, limited to firms financing research projects in 
partnership with universities and employing highly skilled workers in R&D. The Giavazzi Report 
(Giavazzi et al, 2012) commissioned by the Monti government raised the issue of additionality of 
public incentives, based on the concern that that firms could replace their own R&D funds with 
public R&D subsidies; in 2013 a new tax credit measure was introduced based on incremental 
expenditures and in 2015 the finance ministry released the operational regulation for the new tax 
credit scheme. The 2017 Stability law amended the tax credit scheme, available now for 2015-2020, 
allowing a 50% tax credit for R&D expenditure - both internal and external to firms - exceeding the 
average of 2012-2014 spending (previously the rate of tax credit for internal R&D was 25%). The 
maximum amount that firms may obtain as tax credit is raised from €5 million to €20 million. An 
assessment of this measure by Istat found that in 2015 7,993 private businesses benefitted from the 
tax credit for around €590 million; the average per firm is modest (less than €75,000), three quarters 
of recipients are located in Northern regions and no additionality of the tax credit measure was 
found (ISTAT, 2018f).  
 
The Patent Box. The emphasis put in recent decades on a greater protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) has brought to Italy – with the 2015 stability law - the ‘patent box’, a specific tax 
benefit for firms’ earnings coming from patents, trademarks, licenses and software. A deduction 
from the firm’s tax base is provided for  30% of the incomes from patents, trademarks, licenses and 
software in 2015, 40% in 2016 and 50% in 2017. Patent boxes are indirect, semiautomatic 
incentives common in the OECD countries. Their objective is to stimulate the production of patents 
and IPRs, but no empirical evidence on such an impact is available, as argued by Mazzucato (2013). 
In fact, the ‘Patent box’ plays a key role in the strategies of large firms to reduce taxation on their 
technology-related earnings. The global tax planning strategies of multinational companies often 
‘hide’ profits in royalty payments for patents and IPRs, ‘locating’ them is subsidiaries benefitting of 
measures such as the ‘Patent box’. The public benefits, also in terms of additionality effect, of 
Italy’s ‘Patent box’ measure are yet to be proved. 
 
Machinery and equipment. In 2013 the government reintroduced an incentive scheme for the 
acquisition of machinery and equipment by SMEs that has long been a key part of Italy’s industrial 
policy (DL 69/2013 ‘New Sabatini Law’). SMEs are offered soft loans, with Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti (Italy’s public bank) providing credit for investment and the Ministry of Economic 
Development covering the cost of interest reduction. Between April 2014 and June 2015 more than 
5,000 SMEs applied to the scheme for an investment of around €1.7 billion. The 2016 budget law 
has introduced a measure allowing accelerated depreciation of investment up to 140% of the 
original cost, resulting in a tax reduction on profits. The 2017 stability law confirmed the incentive 
for machinery investment and increased the incentive in the case of investment associated to the 
'Industria 4.0' strategy that could reach a tax benefit equal to the 250% of the expenditures in digital 
goods.  
 
Loan guarantees for SMEs. A growing emphasis has been put on improving access to financial 
markets for SMEs, but the main tool that is used is the system of loan guarantees (Fondo Nazionale 
di Garanzia) established after the credit crunch originated by the 2008 crisis. The fund provides 
collateral and other instruments allowing SMEs and micro-firms to fund investment through bank 
loans. In the period 2008-2014 the fund made available €32 billion of collateral (of which 17.6 for 
manufacturing firms) triggering about €56 billion of new investment (of which 31.2 in 
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manufacturing) mainly by firms located in Northern regions. In 2014 alone €8.3 billion of collateral 
led to €12.9 billion of new investments.  
 
Support for start-up firms. In 2012 the government introduced legislation supporting the emergence 
of innovative “Start-up firms”. They were defined as new small firms, established in the past five 
years, with a turnover lower than €5 million, focusing on technological innovation, located in a EU 
country with at least one branch in Italy, with no distribution of profits and with at least one of the 
following characteristics: a) R&D expenditure of at least 15% of sales; b) at least one third of the 
employees holding a PhD degree or attending a doctoral course and at least 50% of the workforce 
holding a university degree; c) ownership of at least one patent, trademark or license. Start-up firms 
are offered indirect incentives (tax holidays, lower administrative costs, some exceptions to labour 
laws and tax bonus for investors), an earmarked access to the loan guarantee fund, support for their 
internationalization efforts and access to innovative financial instruments such as crowdfunding. 
The 2017 Stability law has confirmed such measures. In 2015 the government introduced also the 
notion of “Innovative SMEs” with softer requirements. 
 
Capitalisation incentives. Over the last years, specific tax incentives have been introduced in order 
to favour the expansion of capital of undercapitalised firms (Aiuto alla Crescita Economica, set up 
in 2011). Combined with the accelerated depreciation of investments mentioned above, these 
measures are estimated to cost €3.5 billion in foregone tax receipts for 2016, with larger firms as 
main beneficiaries. Moreover, the analysis of the impact of such measures does not find any 
particular tax advantage for high tech firms (ISTAT, 2016b). 
 
ICTs and the Digital Agenda. A comprehensive policy for the development of ICTs has long been 
missing in Italy. The ‘Digital Agenda’ is the current initiative addressing the issue. The Ministry for 
Economic Development (MISE) has launched in December 2014 the call ‘ICT-Agenda digitale’ on 
key enabling technologies, funded by its ‘Sustainable Growth Fund’. The same Fund finances with 
€250 million the Sustainable industry plan (call ‘Industria sostenibile’, financing projects on 
sustainable growth and the green economy) and with €500 million the new National research 
Programme (PNR). In 2014 MISE introduced IT vouchers for SMEs, with a direct funding for the 
acquisition of IT materials. 
 
EU Structural funds. The National Operational Programme ‘Research and Competitiveness’ 
(PONREC) has been co-financed by EU Structural Funds and by Italy’s Government with €4.4 
billion for the period 2007-2013
14
. The PONREC increased the percentage of resources of 
Structural Funds spent for R&D from 3.1% in 2000-2006 to 22% in 2007-2013, falling to 15% in 
the new Programme 2014-2020. This plan includes resources coming from ERDF (the European 
Regional Developmental Fund) for €1.29 billion, from ESF (the European Social Fund) for €930 
million, and from Italy’s co-financing for €360 million. MIUR will be in charge of the programme 
that addresses technological clusters, enabling technologies and research infrastructures.  
 
Foreign investment. In 2013 the government announced the plan ‘Destinazione Italia’ (Presidenza 
del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2013) envisaging fifty actions for creating a business environment more 
attractive for foreign investment; they include simplified bureaucratic procedures, custom reform, 
an Agency devoted to supporting foreign investment, favourable investment rules and tax 
incentives.  
 
                                                          
14
 Resources were reduced in October 2012 after the reprogramming of MISE and MIUR. Funding 
from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is €3,102 million 
(http://www.ponrec.it/programma/risorse-finanziarie). 
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Smart Specialisation Strategy. A significant departure from the ‘horizontal’ approach to policy 
came at the European level with the launch of the Smart Specialisation Strategy that asked each 
region to identify its areas of strength in research and innovation, providing EU funds to support 
them. Since 2013 Italy’s strategy is managed by the government agency Invitalia in cooperation 
with MISE and MIUR, and has led to an extensive involvement of regional authorities and 
economic actors; activities are expected to trigger public-private partnerships and the involvement 
of universities and public research organisations.  By 2016 all regions had set up their strategy, 
leading to five national thematic areas and twelve regional thematic areas of specialisation. The five 
national areas include: Aerospace and defence; Health, nutrition and life quality; Smart and 
sustainable manufacturing, energy and environment; Tourism, cultural heritage and creative 
industries; and Digital agenda, smart communities, infrastructures and smart mobility.  
In 2016, the Agency for territorial cohesion assessed current policy measures, pointing out the 
contrast between the high quality of the research output, the small size of Italy’s skill-intensive 
industries and the lack of a common governance of the R&I system. The document provides details 
on the governance and monitoring system and on the financial framework (Agenzia per la coesione 
territoriale, 2016)
15
. 
A new initiative funding business R&D projects in three technological areas coherent with the 
national strategy of Smart Specialisation was launched in March 2018 by MISE; the fields 
identified include smart factories, agrifood and life sciences. The call made available €562.7m for 
R&D projects addressed to private business and to public-private partnerships, earmarking €387.6m 
for Southern regions
16
.  
 
Industry 4.0  
 
Another departure from the ‘horizontal’ policy approach has come with the Industry 4.0 strategy 
introduced in 2016 (renamed in 2017 ‘Impresa 4.0’). The concept of Industry 4.0 originated in 
Germany to support the digital transformation of production, challenging US monopoly power in 
digital networks and platforms. The Italian government identified the specific goal of spreading 
advanced digital technologies such as robotics and automation, cloud computing, big data, sensors, 
3D printers and introduced a wide range of measures (see also Bianchi, 2018).  
In 2017 the accelerated depreciation allowance of the cost of acquisition of machinery in the fields 
associated to ‘Industria 4.0’ was introduced; other measures included  venture capital benefits, high 
tech infrastructures and university and secondary education support, all financed by the 2017 budget 
law. The targets of such policy included €10 billion of expected additional private investments in 
2017-2018; €11.3 billion of expected R&D and innovation expenditure by business in 2017-2020; 
€2.6 billion of expected early stage investments in new firms in 2017-2020.  
In the 2018 stability law (Legge 205/2017, 29 December 2017; MEF et al., 2017) measures have 
introduced a preferential treatment for activities related to Industry 4.0 in a variety of policy fields:  
- The accelerated depreciation allowance for investment in machinery of 140% of the cost of 
acquisition is increased to 250% for equipment associated to the fields of ‘Impresa 4.0’.  
- Out the €330 million allotted for 2018-2023 to tax benefits for the acquisition of machinery 
(‘Nuova Sabatini’) one third, around €110 million, is allocated to the activities associated with 
‘Impresa 4.0’.  
                                                          
15
 The document can be downloaded from: 
www.agenziacoesione.gov.it/opencms/export/sites/dps/it/documentazione/politiche_e_attivita/Progr
ammazione_2014_2020/Strategie/Strategia_Nazionale_di_Specializzazione_Intelligente_Italia.pdf 
16
 http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/index.php/it/incentivi/impresa/bando-fabbrica-intelligente-
agrifood-e-scienze-vita 
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- Out of €3.5 billion of the resources for Contratti di Sviluppo, funds supporting restructuring 
projects in areas of industrial crisis, mainly in Southern Italy, €1 billion is associated with Impresa 
4.0 activities.  
- €100 million is allocated to ‘digital trade chains’ supporting sales networks of ‘Made in Italy’ 
products.  
- €3.5 billion is available between 2017 and 2020 for digital infrastructures; targets for 2020 include 
access for all firms to the 30 mbps bandwidth network; and access for 50% of firms to the 100 mbps 
bandwidth network.  
- €250 million is allocated to tax benefits for the training of the employees involved in the 
technologies supported by ‘Impresa 4.0’.  
- New funds are provided for expanding non-university tertiary education (Istituti Tecnici Superiori) 
with €10 million in 2018, €20 million in 2019 and €35 million in 2020. Other measures support 
doctoral courses in the relevant fields. 
MISE is in charge of the implementation of 'Impresa 4.0' with a multi-level coordinating body that 
includes six ministries, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, business organisations, trade unions and 
Polytechnics (MEF et al., 2017). According to an estimate of the Ufficio Parlamentare di Bilancio, 
the body in charge of the estimation of the costs of policy measures, the lower tax revenue due to 
the incentives would amount to €2.3 billion in 2018 and around €4 billion in 2019-2020 (UPB, 
2017) 
While ‘Impresa 4.0’ plays a positive role in bringing attention to the technological backwardness of 
Italian industry and the need for an innovative leap, the methods and direction of the strategy 
present some problems. First, the focus on digital technologies and advanced automation is relevant 
in Italy for a rather limited number of companies - which are already technologically advanced. 
Conversely, Italy’s main problem is broadening the number of innovative firms that at present do 
not have the internal structures and skills – including a significant number of employees with 
university education - to venture on the uncertain ground of digitalisation. The ISTAT report found 
that in the first year of the programme mainly large, technologically advanced firms benefitted from 
such measures; the impact on additional investment is estimated at 0,1% only (ISTAT, 2018f).  
Since 2017 the impact of ‘Impresa 4.0’ has been more relevant, stimulating a new demand of 
advanced machinery and equipment for domestic producers. ISTAT’s index of industrial production 
for Italian instrumental goods increased from 97.8 in June 2016 to 111.1 in June 2018
17
. The 
domestic market – including Italian firms benefitting from the incentives of Impresa 4.0 – over the 
same period had an increase in the index from 95.5 to 111.5. In 2017 the industrial automation 
sector showed an increase (in current prices, compared to 2016) of sales by Italian producers by 
11.6%; imports increased by 12.5% (ANIE Automazione, 2018, p.28).  
Impresa 4.0 is having a positive modernization effect and has provided a stimulus to business 
investment. It remains to be seen whether these effects reach beyond the most advanced group of 
Italian manufacturing firms and favour a broader technological upgrading of Italian industry. 
A second concern is that Impresa 4.0 is inspired to a model of far reaching automation that may 
reduce human labour and competences and concentrate control over complex processes in few large 
companies. This trajectory of technological change may have a limited coherence with Italy’s 
industrial structure where small and medium sized firms are prevalent also in the industrial 
automation sector. There is a risk that such policy may lead to a more polarised industrial structure, 
lower employment and higher inequalities (Pianta, 2018a, 2018b; Guarascio and Pianta, 2018). 
 
6. Four questions for Italy’s research and innovation 
 
The Italian research and innovation system is at a turning point. The historical weaknesses linked to 
the limited technological activities of the country have been compounded by the consequences of 
                                                          
17
 Data from dati.istat.it. 
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ten years of crisis. The historical weaknesses of the Italian research and innovation system are well 
known: a low R&D intensity, production specialization in mature industries, too few large and 
medium-sized firms, limited activities in high technology, acquisition by foreign multinationals of 
many Italian innovative companies, difficulties in financing innovation, low public spending for 
R&D and universities, modest percentage of graduates in the workforce, strong territorial 
polarisation between some technologically advanced areas in Northern Italy and the rest of the 
country. The effects of the crisis introduced new fragilities in the system: firms have suffered major 
losses in production and have reduced investment, weakening the country’s capabilities; the 
introduction of innovations was postponed waiting for a recovery in demand that has long lagged; 
research and decision-making centres in production systems have been increasingly moved abroad, 
austerity policies have reduced public spending on research and university, thousands of young 
researchers and highly qualified graduates have left the country to look for work abroad. The result 
of the ‘lost decade’ is a further structural weakening of Italy’s research and innovation system. 
In the last two years, some signs of attention to research and innovation have emerged: the 2015-
2020 National Research Program was approved (late), the Industry 4.0 program was launched, tax 
incentives were extended to the private R&D for 2015-2020, there have been initiatives on the 
National Smart Specialization Strategy, funding based on merit of the universities according to the 
evaluation of the quality of the research. However, the country's total R & D expenditure growth 
was modest and the amount of public resources was greatly reduced compared to the beginning of 
the crisis: from 2010 to 2015, public R & D expenditure decreased in real terms by 18%; within 
this, from 2008 to 2014 public spending for state universities decreased by 14%. On these as other 
indicators - private R & D, university students, graduates, etc. - in the years of crisis the gap 
between Italy and other major European countries has widened further. 
In addition to limited resources, recent policy measures for research and innovation have some 
problematic aspects. There is no public demand policy that can create spaces for the investments 
and innovations of Italian companies. In the incentives for research and measures for Industry 4.0 
there remains a 'horizontal' approach which results - after decades of such policies - inadequate to 
concentrate the commitment of companies towards new technological skills in some key areas for 
the country. Many measures - those for Industry 4.0 and for example university - can have the effect 
of increasing the polarization of the system between a few excellences on one side and the rest of 
the country on the other. 
Four key policy questions emerge from this analysis of Italy’s research and innovation policy. 
 
a. Can Italian firms grow without technology? 
 
Despite the presence of a significant group of innovative firms with good export performances, the 
Italian economy is characterised by an overwhelming majority of small and micro enterprises with a 
low R&D intensity. The concentration of the Italian business sector in the typical activities of the 
‘made in Italy’ is generally associated with low and medium technology activities. Italy’s economic 
structure continues to show a lower presence in high technology manufacturing and service 
industries, compared to major EU countries. Are these characteristics of Italian firms compatible 
with good long term economic performances?  
 
Figure 12 here 
 
An interesting way to explore possible answers is to compare the long term evolution of 
technological efforts and economic growth in Germany and Italy. Figure 12 shows the R&D 
expenditure per employee and the growth of real value added in industry groups over the long term, 
1995-2014; manufacturing industries are grouped in science-based, scale intensive, specialised 
machine producers and traditional sectors. A double gap between Italy and Germany appears – that 
in some way representative of a broader divide between Europe’s ‘core’ countries and the Southern 
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‘periphery’. First there is the gap in R&D expenditure per employee – an issue already pointed out 
above – with Italy’s industries lagging behind German research efforts in all fields; in science based 
industries Italy’s modest activities have an R&D intensity that is half the German levels; this gap is 
visible in all industry groups and even in the traditional industries where Italy is specialised 
Germany spends much more that Italian firms.  
A second gap concerns growth performances; the rate of growth of real value added in Germany is 
always two or three times the one for Italy. The evidence shows that for both countries technology 
matters for growth; a clear relationship between higher technological efforts and faster growth 
emerges for both countries. Simply, Germany and Italy appear to be in two different ‘leagues’; 
science based firms in Germany had an average growth close to 6% per year over two decades – an 
increase typical of East Asian economies – that was driven by large R&D efforts; the worst 
performing German industry groups had an expansion of about 3% that was close to the best 
performing Italian industry group. Such a diverging dynamics between the two major 
manufacturing countries of Europe documents a new ‘hierarchical’ structure in technology and 
industry, and raises major questions on the coherence and cohesion of Europe’s economy (see also 
Celi et al., 2018). 
How do recent policies relate to these structural problems of Italy’s technology and industry? In a 
previous study (Lucchese et al., 2016) we have documented how in the last three decades the 
policies of privatisation, liberalisation and reliance on ‘markets’ have contributed to weaken Italy’s 
technology and industry. The recent Industry 4.0 programme – discussed in section 5 above - has 
two positive aspects – the emphasis on the importance of technology and the targeting of resources 
to specific fields, as opposed to ‘horizontal’ incentives for all firms. It has, however, two major 
limits – a model of ‘extreme’ automation and digitalisation that tends to displace labour and human 
skills, and a focus on the major Italian firms that already are technologically advanced, with little 
attention to the need to expand the number of innovative firms, upgrading their competences and 
technologies in an appropriate way.  
The question whether Italian firms may survive and grow without adequate technological efforts 
has acquired a new urgency. But it is, in fact, an old question for the Italian economy. Already 
twenty years ago, in 1996, we argued that “we are facing a weakening of the technological base of 
Italy’s industry, which adds to the gap in aggregate indicators of technological activities (...). This 
dynamics is distancing Italy from the 'virtuous circle' between technology, growth and employment 
that is common to other advanced countries” (Pianta, 1996, pp.275-276). In the aftermath of the the 
1992 currency crisis, and of an export-based recovery driven by a 30% depreciation, we argued that 
“devaluation, export-led growth, the deepening of the country’s specialization in traditional 
industries and the reduction of the role of technology can be seen as the result of the failure to 
expand Italy’s presence in high technology in the favorable period of the 1980s”. The result was 
that “between 1980 and 1994, employment in industry decreased by 1.4 million, nearly a quarter of 
the total. After the recession of the 1990s, the combined effect of industry’s technological fragility, 
labor-saving innovations, the international organization of production and competition in more open 
markets could have an even more serious impact on the decline of the industrial production and 
employment in Italy” (ibid., pp.276-276; see also Lucchese et al., 2016).  
Italy’s last twenty years have been marked by economic decline and a systematic retreat of public 
policy (Pianta, 2012); the decade since the 2008 crisis has seen a deepening of such processes with 
growing gaps in research, technological activities and investment compared to other European 
countries. A reversal of such dynamics appears as a crucial challenge for the future of Italian firms. 
 
b. Can public research survive with inadequate funds?  
 
The historical weakness of Italy’s public research and innovation system has dramatically worsened 
in the last decade when austerity policies have led to a major reduction in public expenditure in this 
field, reducing university funding, the activities of public research organisations and the financing 
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of private R&D and innovation in areas of policy priorities. The 19% fall in real terms between 
2008 and 2016 - documented in Figure 5 above – is without parallels in Europe (with few 
exceptions of crisis-battered economies, such as Greece). Such a reduction of public research and 
university activities may lead to a risk of losing the critical mass required for developing high 
quality science and technology. It is a paradox that such deep cuts have taken place at the same time 
when major improvements in the research outputs of Italian (largely public) researchers were 
achieved. We have documented (see Figure 9 above) Italy’s high and rising productivity measured 
in terms of scientific papers (or citations received by them) per million of R&D expenditure, one of 
the few measures where Italy is well ahead of the UK, France and Germany. This finding shows the 
quality of Italian research and its relevance in the scientific world. However, as pointed out above, 
with a declining public research system and large number of university professors approaching 
retirement without an adequate turnover, the scientific success of Italian scholars could be a 
temporary effect that may soon be lost in a weakening system, lacking resources and allowing a 
mass emigration of its young researchers. Restoring public research to the levels of ten years ago, 
with a large increase in public expenditure for R&D and universities, is an urgent – but feasible –
first step for Italy’s research and innovation policy. 
 
c. Can the economy do without university education?  
 
As a consequence of the reduction in government funding for public research, resources devoted to 
universities experienced a 14% fall in real terms between 2008 and 2014 and the number of 
universities’ permanent staff  decreased by 20% between 2009 and 2016 (see Figure 6 above). As a 
result of the 2008 crisis and of reduced public funds, the number of student enrolments in Italy’s 
universities experienced a 20.4% reduction between 2003-2004 and 2014-2015. In latest years 
enrolments have increased again at a low pace, with the exception of Southern Italy.  
This weakening of the university system is particularly negative as Italy has a major gap in the 
share of university-educated citizens. The most recent OECD data show that in 2017 Italy had a 
share of 26.8% of youth of 25-34 years of age with a university degree; this is the lowest among 
European Union countries, with France at 44.3%, Spain at 42.6% and Germany at 31.3% (OECD, 
2018). 
Public R&D, university funding and education are areas where Italy’s gap with EU standards is 
expanding at a worrying pace.  
When we consider education and the quality of Italy’s labour force, there is a clear danger of a 
‘vicious circle’ between: a) an economic structure where medium-low technologies are prevalent; b) 
a modest demand by firms for employees with university degrees; c) stagnant productivity resulting 
from the combination of low technology and low human skills, leading to gaps in innovation and 
competitiveness compared to major European countries; d) further reduction in economic activites 
and concentration at the lower end of international production, with job losses and stagnant wages. 
The precarisation of Italian labour can be seen, in fact, as a way to ‘adapt’ to such downward 
dynamics with a search for price competitiveness based on lower labour costs – as opposed to the 
technological competitiveness typical of ‘core’ European countries – and with a shift towards low 
education, low productivity, low wage, precarious jobs. The negative impact that such a trajectory 
of flexible, precarious labour may have on innovation performances has already been investigated 
(Kleinknecht, van Schaik, Zhou, 2014; Wachsen and Blind, 2016; Cirillo, Fana, Guarascio, 2017; 
Cetrulo, Cirillo, Guarascio, 2018). 
The connection between the weakening of Italy’s public research and the lack of employment 
opportunities for graduates is made evident by the growing migration of Italian researchers and 
highly qualified personnel to other countries (see Figures 7 and 8 above), where employment 
opportunities and research funds are greater and – often – where individual merit has a greater 
recognition in academic practices. 
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d. Can territorial divides be allowed to expand further? 
 
The regional divide in Italy’s research and innovation is a mirror image of the divergence between 
Italy and ‘core’ European countries. The last decade has seen a deepening of regional disparities as 
a result of several factors. The long recession after the 2008 crisis has especially hit Central and 
Southern regions leading to losses of technological and production capabilities; innovation has been 
discouraged by stagnating demand in poorer regions; R&D activities have been concentrated in the 
strongest Northern regions; specific policies – on public R&D expenditure, university funding, tax 
incentives to firms - have actively contributed to deepening regional disparities. We may argue that 
some Northern regions – Lombardy and Emilia Romagna in particular – have research and 
innovation standards that are on a par with ‘core’ European countries, and in fact are increasingly 
integrated in production and technological systems that are often centred in Germany (see Celi et 
al., 2018). At the same time, other Northern and Central regions have lost ground in research, 
innovation and production capabilities, and the gap with Southern regions has seriously increased. 
The question can be asked whether a geographically reduced base for Italy’s best research and 
innovation performers could be too limited, far from the critical mass required to remain a strong 
player in Europe’s research and innovation. An excessive reliance on few centres of excellence in 
R&D, academic research and innovation integrated in global networks may end up reducing the 
diffusion of knowledge in the economy and the transfer of technologies to firms,  limiting the 
potential contribution of research to local development. Conversely, a broader regional presence of 
R&D and innovation capabilities would allow a diversification of competences, specialisations and 
economic activities, building a more robust and resilient innovation system. 
The concentration of R&D efforts in major Northern regions has also set in motion a large internal 
migration of university students, graduates looking for employment, highly qualified workers and 
researchers. On the one hand this supports the positive performance of ‘core’ regions, but on the 
other hand further reduces the labour quality and competences available in ‘periphery’ regions, 
leading to poorer performances. A novel policy for rebalancing these regional asymmetries would 
be required in order to prevent a further polarisation and weakening of Italy’s research and 
innovation system. 
The European and international context 
 
Finally, these challenges for Italian policy should not be viewed in a national context alone. Within 
Europe, there is a growing debate on the future of Europe’s research and innovation policy, with 
differing views on the priorities and policy tools of the new ‘Horizon Europe’ agenda that is 
expected to replace the current ‘Horizon 2020’ programme. On the one hand, there is pressure for 
concentrating EU resources in the major players and in the fields of greater strength, with the risk of 
worsening the divergence in research and innovation within Europe (Lamy Report, 2017). 
Conversely, a new departure based on ‘mission-oriented’ research and innovation programmes, 
reflecting broader economic, social and environmental priorities, has been proposed (Mazzucato, 
2018). 
At the international level, a recent important contribution came from the Science Academies of G7 
countries that in 2017 produced the joint statement ‘New economic growth: the role of science, 
technology, innovation and infrastructure’ (G7 Science Academies, 2017; Quadrio Curzio, 2017). 
The document urges governments to:  “i) expand investment and capabilities in science and pre-
competitive technologies; ii) increase investment in infrastructures - both tangible and intangible - 
that contribute to inclusive development and to progress in science and technology; iii) promote the 
development of capacities to design, engineer, produce and deliver products and services based on 
new science and technology; iv) promote open access - subject to appropriate regulations with 
regard to intellectual property - to advances in science and technology, while preventing the 
emergence of monopolistic practices; v) share effective practices in policies and programs that 
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promote innovation, technological diffusion, and efficient infrastructure development (...); vi) 
ensure that appropriate governance frameworks are adopted, so that the benefits of science and 
technology are fully realized, while maintaining public trust” (G7 Science Academies, 2017, p.1). 
The statement argues that “growing levels of public and private investments in science and 
technology are needed to address the challenges of sustainable and inclusive growth” and that 
“current gaps in R&D efforts make it more difficult to access, adopt and expand knowledge and 
innovation, limiting the realization of their benefits. Public policies should recognize the key role 
that expenditure for the advancement and diffusion of knowledge, culture, higher education and 
innovation can play in supporting high quality socio-economic growth, and that these benefits 
outweigh many short-term concerns for balancing public finances”. To this end, G7 Academies 
argue that “governments can play an important role in stimulating new demand through targeted 
public research programs, procurement for public services, and public investment in infrastructure” 
(ibid., p.2).  
With regard to corporations, the statement by the Academies of Sciences argues that “in recent 
years, many corporations have limited investment in research and technology - which requires long 
investment horizons - and have favoured short-term returns from financial assets, thus presenting a 
further threat to economic growth. Well-designed public policies could encourage business 
investment with longer time horizons, supporting also high-risk projects” (ibid.). 
These arguments are developed by the G7 Science Academies “in line with Goal 9 of the UN 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, which is to ‘Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation’. In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis 
that has slowed down world growth, we need to make sure that investment in science, technology, 
innovation and infrastructure expands its contribution to sustainable and inclusive world growth” 
(ibid. p.1). 
The arguments of the G7 Science Academies statement provide a highly appropriate framework for 
a long term strategy combining private investment and public policies for restoring Italy’s research 
and innovation capabilities.   
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Figure 1. GDP at market prices, 2007-2017  
Chain linked volumes, index 2007=100 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
  
-10,0 
-5,0 
0,0 
5,0 
10,0 
15,0 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Italy 
France 
Germany 
Spain 
EU28 
UK 
32 
 
Figure 2. R&D activities in OECD and major countries, 2015 
 
 
Source: OECD (2017, p.26) 
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Figure 3. Total R&D expenditure (GERD) 1995-2016 in Italy, Germany and France. 
Million euros/purchasing power standards, 2005 prices 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 4. Italy’s Total R&D expenditures (GERD), R&D performed by business (BERD), 
appropriations in government budget (GBAORD) 
Million euros/purchasing power standards, 2005 prices 
 
 
Source: Eurostat-Istat 
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Figure 5. Total public expenditure for R&D (GBAORD) in Italy 2008-2016  
Million euros/purchasing power standards, 2005 prices 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 6 University permanent staff in Italy, 2009-2016 
 
 
Source: MIUR 
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Figure 7. International net outflows of scientific authors, 2002-16 
 
Source: OECD (2017,  pp. 128-129) https://doi.org/10.1787/sti_scoreboard-2017-17-en 
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Figure 8. Flows of scientific authors between Italy and other countries, 2006-2016 
 
 
Source: OECD (2017) pp. 128-129 https://doi.org/10.1787/sti_scoreboard-2017-17-en 
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Fig. 9. Scientific productivity in major countries, 2011-2014.  
Number of scientific publications per expenditures for R&D.  
Expenditures in million US dollars at 2010 Purchasing Power Parities 
 
Source: ANVUR (2016, p.30). 
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Fig. 10. University students, new enrolments and graduates, years 2009-2010 and 2016-2017 
 
 
Source: data from the Anagrafe Nazionale degli Studenti http://anagrafe.miur.it (update 30/07/2018) 
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Figure 11. Total expenditure for R&D  in Italian regions, 1995-2014  
Million euros/purchasing power standards, 2005 prices 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 12. R&D expenditure and value added growth in manufacturing sectors,  
Germany (DE) and Italy (IT), 1995-2014 
 
Revised Pavitt industry groups : 
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